Falcon-512 Security-Focused API Documentation
Version: 1.0
Last Updated: 2025-07-05
**Security Classification: PUBLIC
Author: Phantom (phantom@metamui.id)
Overview
Falcon-512 is a post-quantum digital signature scheme based on the NTRU lattice and selected as one of NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standards. It provides 128-bit classical security and strong quantum resistance through compact signatures and efficient verification. Falcon uses a trapdoor sampler over NTRU lattices with Gaussian sampling for security.
Security Level: NIST Level 1 (128-bit classical, ~2^64 quantum)
Public Key Size: 897 bytes
Private Key Size: 1281 bytes
Signature Size: ~666 bytes (variable)
Quantum Security: Strong lattice-based resistance
Security Warnings ⚠️
- Post-Quantum Ready: Designed specifically for quantum-resistant security
- Variable Signatures: Signature sizes vary due to rejection sampling
- Side-Channel Sensitive: Implementation must protect against timing/power attacks
- Key Generation Critical: Requires high-quality randomness for security
- Not Deterministic: Same message produces different signatures
API Functions
falcon512_keygen() -> (PublicKey[897], PrivateKey[1281])
Security Contract:
- Preconditions:
- System CSPRNG must be available
- Sufficient entropy for lattice sampling
- Implementation protects against side-channels
- Postconditions:
- Returns mathematically valid key pair
- Private key enables signing, public key enables verification
- Keys are independent across generations
Attack Resistance: | Attack Type | Protected | Notes | |————-|———–|——-| | Quantum (Shor’s) | ✅ | Lattice-based security | | Quantum (Grover’s) | ✅ | 128-bit security maintained | | Classical Lattice | ✅ | NTRU lattice hardness | | Side-Channel | ⚠️ | Implementation dependent | | Key Recovery | ✅ | Provable lattice security | | Forgery | ✅ | Fiat-Shamir with abort |
Security Requirements:
- Use cryptographically secure randomness
- Protect private key generation from observation
- Implement constant-time operations where possible
- Secure key storage with proper access controls
Secure Usage Example:
import secrets
import hashlib
from typing import Tuple, Optional
import time
import json
class SecureFalcon512:
"""Secure Falcon-512 implementation with best practices"""
def __init__(self):
self.key_pair = None
self.key_generation_time = None
self.usage_counter = 0
def generate_keypair(self, entropy_sources: Optional[list] = None) -> dict:
"""Generate Falcon-512 key pair with enhanced entropy"""
# Gather entropy from multiple sources
entropy_pool = bytearray()
# System randomness
entropy_pool.extend(secrets.token_bytes(64))
# High-resolution timing
import time
timing_entropy = str(time.perf_counter_ns()).encode()
entropy_pool.extend(hashlib.sha256(timing_entropy).digest())
# Additional entropy sources if provided
if entropy_sources:
for source in entropy_sources:
if hasattr(source, 'read'):
# File-like entropy source
entropy_pool.extend(source.read(32))
else:
# Byte entropy source
entropy_pool.extend(bytes(source)[:32])
# Process entropy
final_seed = hashlib.shake_256(
b"Falcon512-KeyGen-v1:" + bytes(entropy_pool)
).digest(64)
# Clear entropy pool
for i in range(len(entropy_pool)):
entropy_pool[i] = 0
# Generate key pair (using final_seed for deterministic generation)
public_key, private_key = self._falcon512_keygen_from_seed(final_seed)
# Store key pair
self.key_pair = {
'public_key': public_key,
'private_key': private_key,
'generated_at': time.time(),
'algorithm': 'Falcon-512',
'version': '1.0'
}
self.key_generation_time = time.time()
# Clear seed
for i in range(len(final_seed)):
final_seed[i] = 0
return {
'public_key': public_key.hex(),
'key_id': self._compute_key_id(public_key),
'algorithm': 'Falcon-512',
'generated_at': self.key_generation_time
}
def _falcon512_keygen_from_seed(self, seed: bytes) -> Tuple[bytes, bytes]:
"""Generate Falcon-512 keys from seed (implementation placeholder)"""
# This would call the actual Falcon-512 implementation
# For security, this should be implemented with:
# - Constant-time operations where possible
# - Secure sampling procedures
# - Protection against timing attacks
# Placeholder implementation
from falcon_crypto import falcon512_keygen_seeded
return falcon512_keygen_seeded(seed)
def _compute_key_id(self, public_key: bytes) -> str:
"""Compute stable identifier for public key"""
key_hash = hashlib.sha256(
b"Falcon512-KeyID:" + public_key
).digest()
return key_hash[:16].hex()
def export_public_key(self, format: str = "raw") -> dict:
"""Export public key in specified format"""
if not self.key_pair:
raise ValueError("No key pair generated")
public_key = self.key_pair['public_key']
if format == "raw":
return {
'public_key': public_key.hex(),
'format': 'raw',
'algorithm': 'Falcon-512'
}
elif format == "der":
# DER encoding would be implemented here
der_encoded = self._encode_public_key_der(public_key)
return {
'public_key': der_encoded.hex(),
'format': 'DER',
'algorithm': 'Falcon-512'
}
else:
raise ValueError(f"Unsupported format: {format}")
def should_rotate_keys(self, max_age_days: int = 365) -> bool:
"""Check if keys should be rotated"""
if not self.key_generation_time:
return True
age_seconds = time.time() - self.key_generation_time
age_days = age_seconds / (24 * 3600)
return age_days > max_age_days
# SECURE: Long-term key management
class Falcon512KeyManager:
def __init__(self, storage_backend):
self.storage = storage_backend
self.active_keys = {}
self.rotation_policy = {
'max_age_days': 365,
'max_signatures': 1000000,
'emergency_rotation': False
}
def create_signing_key(self, key_id: str, context: str) -> dict:
"""Create new signing key with metadata"""
falcon = SecureFalcon512()
key_data = falcon.generate_keypair()
# Add metadata
metadata = {
'key_id': key_id,
'context': context,
'created_at': time.time(),
'signature_count': 0,
'status': 'active',
'public_key': key_data['public_key'],
'algorithm': 'Falcon-512'
}
# Store securely
self.storage.store_private_key(
key_id,
falcon.key_pair['private_key'],
metadata
)
self.active_keys[key_id] = {
'falcon': falcon,
'metadata': metadata
}
return metadata
def get_verification_key(self, key_id: str) -> Optional[bytes]:
"""Get public key for verification"""
if key_id in self.active_keys:
return self.active_keys[key_id]['falcon'].key_pair['public_key']
# Try loading from storage
metadata = self.storage.get_key_metadata(key_id)
if metadata:
return bytes.fromhex(metadata['public_key'])
return None
def rotate_key_if_needed(self, key_id: str) -> bool:
"""Rotate key if policy requires it"""
if key_id not in self.active_keys:
return False
key_data = self.active_keys[key_id]
metadata = key_data['metadata']
# Check rotation conditions
age_days = (time.time() - metadata['created_at']) / (24 * 3600)
should_rotate = (
age_days > self.rotation_policy['max_age_days'] or
metadata['signature_count'] > self.rotation_policy['max_signatures'] or
self.rotation_policy['emergency_rotation']
)
if should_rotate:
# Create new key
new_key_id = f"{key_id}-rotated-{int(time.time())}"
self.create_signing_key(new_key_id, metadata['context'])
# Mark old key as deprecated
metadata['status'] = 'deprecated'
metadata['deprecated_at'] = time.time()
return True
return False
# SECURE: Message signing with domain separation
def falcon512_sign_message(
private_key: bytes,
message: bytes,
context: str = "",
timestamp: bool = True
) -> dict:
"""Sign message with Falcon-512 including context"""
# Build signing input with domain separation
signing_input = bytearray()
# Add context for domain separation
if context:
signing_input.extend(b"Falcon512-Context:")
signing_input.extend(context.encode())
signing_input.extend(b"\n")
# Add timestamp if requested
if timestamp:
ts = int(time.time())
signing_input.extend(b"Timestamp:")
signing_input.extend(str(ts).encode())
signing_input.extend(b"\n")
# Add message
signing_input.extend(b"Message:")
signing_input.extend(message)
# Hash the complete input
message_hash = hashlib.sha256(signing_input).digest()
# Sign the hash
signature = _falcon512_sign_hash(private_key, message_hash)
result = {
'signature': signature.hex(),
'message_hash': message_hash.hex(),
'algorithm': 'Falcon-512',
'version': '1.0'
}
if context:
result['context'] = context
if timestamp:
result['timestamp'] = ts
return result
Common Mistakes:
# INSECURE: Weak randomness for key generation
import random
seed = random.getrandbits(256) # NOT cryptographically secure!
# INSECURE: Reusing ephemeral values
# Falcon uses randomness in signing - implementation must be secure
# INSECURE: No side-channel protection
# Timing attacks can reveal private key information
# INSECURE: Storing private key in plaintext
with open('private.key', 'w') as f:
f.write(private_key.hex()) # Unencrypted storage!
# INSECURE: No domain separation
sig1 = falcon512_sign(key, message) # Could be replayed in other contexts
falcon512_sign(private_key: bytes[1281], message: bytes) -> bytes[~666]
Security Contract:
- Preconditions:
private_keymust be valid Falcon-512 private keymessagecan be any length- Implementation uses secure randomness for signing
- Postconditions:
- Returns valid signature for message
- Signature size varies (rejection sampling)
- Non-deterministic (different each time)
Attack Resistance: | Attack Type | Protected | Notes | |————-|———–|——-| | Existential Forgery | ✅ | Lattice-based security | | Key Recovery | ✅ | NTRU hardness | | Quantum Attacks | ✅ | Post-quantum secure | | Side-Channel | ⚠️ | Implementation dependent | | Replay | ❌ | Add timestamps/nonces |
Security Requirements:
- Use fresh randomness for each signature
- Protect signing process from observation
- Include context/domain separation
- Implement proper rejection sampling
Secure Usage Example:
use falcon::{Falcon512, PrivateKey, Signature};
use rand::{RngCore, thread_rng};
use zeroize::Zeroize;
/// Secure Falcon-512 signing with context
pub struct SecureFalconSigner {
private_key: PrivateKey,
signature_count: u64,
context: String,
}
impl SecureFalconSigner {
pub fn new(private_key: PrivateKey, context: String) -> Self {
Self {
private_key,
signature_count: 0,
context,
}
}
pub fn sign_with_metadata(
&mut self,
message: &[u8],
additional_context: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<SignedMessage, Error> {
// Build complete message with metadata
let mut signing_data = Vec::new();
// Add primary context
signing_data.extend_from_slice(b"Context:");
signing_data.extend_from_slice(self.context.as_bytes());
signing_data.push(b'\n');
// Add additional context if provided
if let Some(ctx) = additional_context {
signing_data.extend_from_slice(b"AdditionalContext:");
signing_data.extend_from_slice(ctx.as_bytes());
signing_data.push(b'\n');
}
// Add sequence number
signing_data.extend_from_slice(b"Sequence:");
signing_data.extend_from_slice(&self.signature_count.to_le_bytes());
signing_data.push(b'\n');
// Add timestamp
let timestamp = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap()
.as_secs();
signing_data.extend_from_slice(b"Timestamp:");
signing_data.extend_from_slice(×tamp.to_le_bytes());
signing_data.push(b'\n');
// Add actual message
signing_data.extend_from_slice(b"Message:");
signing_data.extend_from_slice(message);
// Sign the complete data
let signature = self.private_key.sign(&signing_data, &mut thread_rng())?;
self.signature_count += 1;
Ok(SignedMessage {
message: message.to_vec(),
signature,
context: self.context.clone(),
additional_context: additional_context.map(|s| s.to_string()),
sequence: self.signature_count - 1,
timestamp,
})
}
pub fn sign_digest(
&mut self,
digest: &[u8; 32],
algorithm: &str,
) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
// For pre-hashed signing
let mut signing_data = Vec::new();
signing_data.extend_from_slice(b"PrehashedMessage:");
signing_data.extend_from_slice(algorithm.as_bytes());
signing_data.push(b':');
signing_data.extend_from_slice(digest);
self.private_key.sign(&signing_data, &mut thread_rng())
}
}
impl Drop for SecureFalconSigner {
fn drop(&mut self) {
// Zeroize private key on drop
self.private_key.zeroize();
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct SignedMessage {
pub message: Vec<u8>,
pub signature: Signature,
pub context: String,
pub additional_context: Option<String>,
pub sequence: u64,
pub timestamp: u64,
}
/// Batch signing for efficiency
pub struct BatchFalconSigner {
signer: SecureFalconSigner,
}
impl BatchFalconSigner {
pub fn sign_batch(
&mut self,
messages: &[&[u8]],
) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, Error> {
let mut signatures = Vec::with_capacity(messages.len());
for message in messages {
let signed = self.signer.sign_with_metadata(message, None)?;
signatures.push(signed.signature);
}
Ok(signatures)
}
pub fn sign_merkle_tree(
&mut self,
leaves: &[&[u8]],
) -> Result<TreeSignature, Error> {
// Create Merkle tree and sign root
let tree = MerkleTree::new(leaves)?;
let root_signature = self.signer.sign_with_metadata(
&tree.root(),
Some("MerkleTree")
)?;
Ok(TreeSignature {
root_signature,
tree,
})
}
}
falcon512_verify(public_key: bytes[897], message: bytes, signature: bytes) -> bool
Security Contract:
- Preconditions:
public_keymust be valid Falcon-512 public keymessageis the original signed messagesignatureis putative Falcon-512 signature
- Postconditions:
- Returns true if signature is valid
- Returns false for any invalid signature
- Constant-time verification preferred
Security Requirements:
- Verify signature format before processing
- Use constant-time comparison operations
- Validate public key format
- Check signature bounds
Secure Usage Example:
class Falcon512Verifier:
"""Secure Falcon-512 signature verification"""
def __init__(self):
self.trusted_keys = {}
self.verification_cache = {}
def add_trusted_key(self, key_id: str, public_key: bytes, metadata: dict):
"""Add trusted public key"""
# Validate public key format
if len(public_key) != 897:
raise ValueError("Invalid Falcon-512 public key size")
# Verify key structure (implementation specific)
if not self._validate_public_key_structure(public_key):
raise ValueError("Invalid Falcon-512 public key structure")
self.trusted_keys[key_id] = {
'public_key': public_key,
'metadata': metadata,
'added_at': time.time()
}
def verify_signed_message(
self,
signed_message: dict,
key_id: str,
expected_context: str = ""
) -> bool:
"""Verify complete signed message"""
if key_id not in self.trusted_keys:
return False
public_key = self.trusted_keys[key_id]['public_key']
# Reconstruct signing input
signing_input = bytearray()
# Add context if present
if 'context' in signed_message:
if expected_context and signed_message['context'] != expected_context:
return False
signing_input.extend(b"Falcon512-Context:")
signing_input.extend(signed_message['context'].encode())
signing_input.extend(b"\n")
# Add timestamp if present
if 'timestamp' in signed_message:
# Check timestamp freshness (optional)
current_time = int(time.time())
if abs(current_time - signed_message['timestamp']) > 3600: # 1 hour
return False
signing_input.extend(b"Timestamp:")
signing_input.extend(str(signed_message['timestamp']).encode())
signing_input.extend(b"\n")
# Add message
signing_input.extend(b"Message:")
signing_input.extend(signed_message['message'].encode())
# Hash the complete input
message_hash = hashlib.sha256(signing_input).digest()
# Verify signature
signature = bytes.fromhex(signed_message['signature'])
return self._falcon512_verify_hash(public_key, message_hash, signature)
def verify_with_caching(
self,
public_key: bytes,
message: bytes,
signature: bytes
) -> bool:
"""Verify with result caching for performance"""
# Create cache key
cache_key = hashlib.sha256(
public_key + message + signature
).digest()[:16].hex()
# Check cache
if cache_key in self.verification_cache:
cached_result, cached_time = self.verification_cache[cache_key]
# Use cached result if recent (within 5 minutes)
if time.time() - cached_time < 300:
return cached_result
# Perform verification
result = self._falcon512_verify_hash(public_key, message, signature)
# Cache result
self.verification_cache[cache_key] = (result, time.time())
# Limit cache size
if len(self.verification_cache) > 1000:
# Remove oldest entries
sorted_cache = sorted(
self.verification_cache.items(),
key=lambda x: x[1][1]
)
# Keep newest 800 entries
self.verification_cache = dict(sorted_cache[-800:])
return result
def batch_verify(
self,
verifications: list
) -> list:
"""Batch verify multiple signatures"""
results = []
for verification in verifications:
public_key = verification['public_key']
message = verification['message']
signature = verification['signature']
result = self.verify_with_caching(public_key, message, signature)
results.append(result)
return results
def _validate_public_key_structure(self, public_key: bytes) -> bool:
"""Validate Falcon-512 public key structure"""
# Implementation would check:
# - Key coefficients are in valid range
# - Key follows Falcon format specification
# - Mathematical constraints are satisfied
# Placeholder implementation
return True
def _falcon512_verify_hash(
self,
public_key: bytes,
message_hash: bytes,
signature: bytes
) -> bool:
"""Low-level Falcon-512 verification"""
# This would call the actual Falcon-512 implementation
from falcon_crypto import falcon512_verify
try:
return falcon512_verify(public_key, message_hash, signature)
except Exception:
return False
Security Best Practices
Key Lifecycle Management
/// Complete key lifecycle for Falcon-512
pub struct Falcon512Lifecycle {
key_store: SecureKeyStore,
audit_log: AuditLogger,
}
impl Falcon512Lifecycle {
pub fn create_key_with_ceremony(
&mut self,
key_id: &str,
ceremony_participants: &[&str],
) -> Result<KeyCeremonyResult, Error> {
// Key generation ceremony with multiple participants
let mut entropy_contributions = Vec::new();
// Collect entropy from each participant
for participant in ceremony_participants {
let contribution = self.collect_entropy_from_participant(participant)?;
entropy_contributions.push(contribution);
}
// Combine entropy sources
let combined_entropy = self.combine_entropy_sources(&entropy_contributions)?;
// Generate key pair
let (public_key, private_key) = self.generate_key_from_entropy(&combined_entropy)?;
// Create key shares for distributed storage
let key_shares = self.create_key_shares(&private_key, ceremony_participants.len())?;
// Store key metadata
let metadata = KeyMetadata {
key_id: key_id.to_string(),
created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
ceremony_participants: ceremony_participants.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect(),
key_type: "Falcon-512".to_string(),
status: KeyStatus::Active,
};
self.key_store.store_public_key(key_id, &public_key, &metadata)?;
// Distribute private key shares
for (i, share) in key_shares.iter().enumerate() {
self.key_store.store_key_share(
key_id,
ceremony_participants[i],
share,
)?;
}
// Log the ceremony
self.audit_log.log_key_generation_ceremony(key_id, ceremony_participants)?;
// Clear sensitive data
combined_entropy.zeroize();
private_key.zeroize();
Ok(KeyCeremonyResult {
key_id: key_id.to_string(),
public_key,
metadata,
})
}
pub fn reconstruct_key_for_signing(
&self,
key_id: &str,
participant_shares: &[(String, KeyShare)],
threshold: usize,
) -> Result<TemporarySigningKey, Error> {
if participant_shares.len() < threshold {
return Err(Error::InsufficientShares);
}
// Verify shares
for (participant, share) in participant_shares {
if !self.key_store.verify_key_share(key_id, participant, share)? {
return Err(Error::InvalidKeyShare);
}
}
// Reconstruct private key
let private_key = self.reconstruct_private_key(participant_shares)?;
// Create temporary signing key with time limit
Ok(TemporarySigningKey::new(
private_key,
std::time::Duration::from_secs(300), // 5 minutes
))
}
}
Certificate Authority Integration
class Falcon512CertificateAuthority:
"""Post-quantum certificate authority using Falcon-512"""
def __init__(self, ca_private_key: bytes, ca_cert: dict):
self.ca_private_key = ca_private_key
self.ca_cert = ca_cert
self.issued_certificates = {}
self.revoked_certificates = set()
def issue_certificate(
self,
subject_public_key: bytes,
subject_info: dict,
validity_period_days: int = 365
) -> dict:
"""Issue post-quantum certificate"""
# Create certificate structure
cert_data = {
'version': 3,
'serial_number': self._generate_serial_number(),
'issuer': self.ca_cert['subject'],
'subject': subject_info,
'public_key': {
'algorithm': 'Falcon-512',
'key': subject_public_key.hex()
},
'validity': {
'not_before': int(time.time()),
'not_after': int(time.time()) + (validity_period_days * 24 * 3600)
},
'extensions': {
'key_usage': ['digital_signature', 'key_agreement'],
'extended_key_usage': ['client_auth', 'server_auth'],
'subject_alt_name': subject_info.get('alt_names', [])
}
}
# Serialize certificate for signing
cert_bytes = self._serialize_certificate(cert_data)
# Sign certificate with CA key
signature_data = falcon512_sign_message(
self.ca_private_key,
cert_bytes,
context="X.509-Certificate-v3",
timestamp=True
)
# Complete certificate
certificate = {
**cert_data,
'signature': {
'algorithm': 'Falcon-512',
'value': signature_data['signature']
}
}
# Store issued certificate
serial = cert_data['serial_number']
self.issued_certificates[serial] = certificate
return certificate
def verify_certificate_chain(
self,
cert_chain: list,
trusted_roots: list
) -> bool:
"""Verify post-quantum certificate chain"""
if not cert_chain:
return False
# Check each certificate in chain
for i, cert in enumerate(cert_chain):
if i == 0:
# End entity certificate
if not self._verify_certificate_validity(cert):
return False
else:
# Intermediate or root certificate
if not self._verify_certificate_validity(cert):
return False
# Verify signature on previous certificate
prev_cert = cert_chain[i-1]
if not self._verify_certificate_signature(prev_cert, cert):
return False
# Verify root certificate is trusted
root_cert = cert_chain[-1]
if not any(self._certificates_equal(root_cert, trusted)
for trusted in trusted_roots):
return False
return True
def revoke_certificate(self, serial_number: str, reason: str):
"""Revoke certificate"""
self.revoked_certificates.add(serial_number)
# Update Certificate Revocation List
self._update_crl(serial_number, reason)
def generate_crl(self) -> dict:
"""Generate Certificate Revocation List"""
crl_data = {
'version': 2,
'issuer': self.ca_cert['subject'],
'this_update': int(time.time()),
'next_update': int(time.time()) + (7 * 24 * 3600), # 7 days
'revoked_certificates': [
{
'serial_number': serial,
'revocation_date': int(time.time()),
'reason': 'unspecified'
}
for serial in self.revoked_certificates
]
}
# Sign CRL
crl_bytes = self._serialize_crl(crl_data)
signature_data = falcon512_sign_message(
self.ca_private_key,
crl_bytes,
context="X.509-CRL-v2"
)
return {
**crl_data,
'signature': {
'algorithm': 'Falcon-512',
'value': signature_data['signature']
}
}
Common Integration Patterns
Hybrid Classical/Post-Quantum Signatures
/// Dual signature with classical and post-quantum algorithms
pub struct HybridSigner {
ecdsa_key: EcdsaPrivateKey,
falcon_key: Falcon512PrivateKey,
}
impl HybridSigner {
pub fn sign_hybrid(&self, message: &[u8]) -> HybridSignature {
// Sign with both algorithms
let ecdsa_sig = self.ecdsa_key.sign(message);
let falcon_sig = self.falcon_key.sign(message);
HybridSignature {
ecdsa: ecdsa_sig,
falcon: falcon_sig,
}
}
pub fn verify_hybrid(
&self,
message: &[u8],
signature: &HybridSignature,
) -> bool {
// Both signatures must be valid
self.ecdsa_key.verify(message, &signature.ecdsa) &&
self.falcon_key.verify(message, &signature.falcon)
}
}
Blockchain Integration
def falcon512_blockchain_transaction_signing():
"""Example of Falcon-512 in blockchain context"""
class PostQuantumTransaction:
def __init__(self, sender_key, recipient, amount):
self.sender_key = sender_key
self.recipient = recipient
self.amount = amount
self.timestamp = int(time.time())
self.nonce = secrets.token_bytes(32)
def sign_transaction(self):
# Create transaction data
tx_data = {
'sender': self.sender_key['public_key'],
'recipient': self.recipient,
'amount': self.amount,
'timestamp': self.timestamp,
'nonce': self.nonce.hex()
}
# Serialize for signing
tx_bytes = json.dumps(tx_data, sort_keys=True).encode()
# Sign with Falcon-512
signature = falcon512_sign_message(
self.sender_key['private_key'],
tx_bytes,
context="Blockchain-Transaction-v1"
)
return {
**tx_data,
'signature': signature['signature']
}
Performance Considerations
| Operation | Time (ms) | Size (bytes) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Key Generation | 15-25 | - | Variable due to rejection sampling |
| Signing | 5-15 | ~666 | Variable signature size |
| Verification | 0.1-0.2 | - | Fast verification |
| Public Key | - | 897 | Fixed size |
| Private Key | - | 1281 | Fixed size |
Optimization Strategies
- Pre-generate key pairs for batch operations
- Cache verification results for repeated checks
- Use hardware acceleration where available
- Implement tree signatures for bulk signing
Security Auditing
Verification Checklist
- Using cryptographically secure randomness
- Protecting key generation from side-channels
- Implementing proper rejection sampling
- Adding domain separation to signatures
- Securing private key storage
- Implementing key rotation policies
- Validating signature formats before verification
Common Vulnerabilities
# AUDIT: Look for these patterns
# ❌ Weak randomness
import random
private_key = generate_falcon_key(random.getrandbits(256))
# ❌ Deterministic signing (if incorrectly implemented)
# Falcon should be probabilistic
# ❌ No domain separation
sig1 = falcon512_sign(key, message) # Could be replayed
# ❌ Side-channel vulnerable implementation
# Timing/power attacks on key generation or signing
# ❌ Insecure key storage
pickle.dump(private_key, open('key.pkl', 'wb'))
Security Analysis
Threat Model: Falcon-512 Threat Model
The comprehensive threat analysis covers:
- Algorithm-specific attack vectors
- Implementation vulnerabilities
- Side-channel considerations
- Quantum resistance analysis (where applicable)
- Deployment recommendations
For complete security analysis and risk assessment, see the dedicated threat model documentation.
References
Support
Security Issues: security@metamui.id
Documentation Updates: phantom@metamui.id
Vulnerability Disclosure: See SECURITY.md
Document Version: 1.0
Review Cycle: Quarterly
Next Review: 2025-04-05
Classification: PUBLIC