HQC-128 Threat Model

Side-channel claim limit. Nothing on this page claims constant-time behaviour or side-channel resistance for any target: the side-channel harness covers nothing (finding A48) and no measurement exists. The Rust and C cores are designed for constant time and unmeasured; managed runtimes (JIT, GC, bounds checks) make no timing claim. Where this page names constant-time or side-channel techniques, in prose or in code, they are design intent or recommendations, not measured properties.

Algorithm Family: Code-based (Hamming)
Security Level: 128-bit
Standardization: NIST Round 3
Last Updated: 2025-01-02

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive threat analysis for HQC-128, a Code-based (Hamming) algorithm standardized under NIST Round 3. The algorithm provides 128-bit security against both classical and quantum adversaries.

Algorithm-Specific Threats

Mathematical Foundation

Known Attack Vectors

Lattice Attacks (if applicable)

Implementation Vulnerabilities

Parameter-Specific Security

Parameter Set Classical Security Quantum Security NIST Level
HQC-128 128-bit 128-bit Comparable

Implementation Threats

Side-Channel Vulnerabilities

Common Implementation Errors

  1. Improper randomness in key generation
  2. Incorrect parameter validation
  3. Missing constant-time implementations
  4. Inadequate error handling

Deployment Considerations

Hybrid Mode Threats

Migration Risks

Countermeasures

Algorithm Level

Implementation Level

Protocol Level

Compliance Requirements

Testing and Validation

Security Testing

Interoperability Testing

Real-World Deployment Status

References


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